State of Utah v. David Lee Barrett : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. David Lee Barrett : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Judith S. H. Atherton; assistant attorney general; attorney for
respondent.
James G. Clark; attorney for appellant.
R. PAUL VAN DAM, USB #3312 STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL State Capital Rm. 236 Salt Lake
City, UT 84111 Telephone: (801) 538-1015 Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent
JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 Attorney at Law 96 East 100 South Provo, Utah 84 604 Telephone:
(801) 375-6092 Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Barrett, No. 890435 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2035
UTAH COUHl ur ^ r r w i . * 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. —.TVI w H 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID LEE BARRETT, 
Case No. 890435-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DAVID LEE BARRETT 
APPEAL FROM DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND 
IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE - FINAL 
JUDGMENT OF GUILT ENTERED IN DISTRICT COURT 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, USB #3312 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
State Capital Rm. 236 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 
JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney at Law 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6092 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
DEPOSITED BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG 17 1990 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Respondent 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID LEE BARRETT, 
Case NO. 890435-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DAVID LEE BARRETT 
APPEAL FROM DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND 
IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE - FINAL 
JUDGMENT OF GUILT ENTERED IN DISTRICT COURT 
JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney at Law 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6092 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, USB #3312 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
State Capital Rm. 236 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING-
ISSUES ON APPEAL . . . . 
STATEMENT Cr THE CASE 
A. iNdtur 
R. C^urs. .; .uueeujngs 
r isposition ir '" ,urt Below 
D. i 
' J I I M M A R Y '.I' \ K G U M F , N , l i i -
ARGUMENT 
POIN1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
THE EVIDENCE FOUND DURING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE BECAUSE THERE WERE NO 
EXIGENT r-TFCUMSTANCES 
POINT II 
THE LK.A^ ..oKi LiKtuLu IN REn .>-> TO SUPPRESS 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESl ,.I OF A SEARCH 
OF MR. BARRETT'S VEHICLE BECAUSF C. TACK OF 
PROBABLE CATT.<^  
CONCLUSION 
ADDENDUM 
TABU; OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2) (1953 as amended). .2,9,12,13,14 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1953 as amended) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(g) (1953 as amended). 1 
Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals . 1 
Constitutional Provisions: 
U.S. Constitution 4th Amendment 9,16,17 
Utah Constitution Art. I Section 14 2,9 
CASE AUTHORITIES: 
Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) . . . . 11,16 
Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) 11_,16 
Cole v. State, 728 P.2d 492 (Okl.Cr. 1986) 19 
Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) . . . . 12 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 8,10,11,15 
Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 10 
New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 7,19 
State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 11,13,14 
State v. Coal. 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983) 8,10,19 
State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) . . . 9 
ii 
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). . . . 
State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) 
State v. Groves. 649 P.2d 366 (Hawaii 1982) 
State v. Holmes. 107 Ut.Adv.Rpts 74, 76 (Ct.App. 1989) 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1988) 
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), 
Cert.denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987) 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988) 3,5 
Wong Sun v. UnitedStates, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID LEE BARRETT, 
Case No. 890435-CA 
Defendant/Appellant Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DAVID LEE BARRETT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from final judgment entered by the 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, which States: "In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have . . . the right to 
appeal in all cases." Appellant also seeks review pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (1) (g) (1953 as amended), and Rule 3(a), 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
David Barrett (Barrett) was charged with the Third Degree 
Felony of violating the Utah Controlled Substance Act, 
possession of marijuana. Barrett moved to suppress the 
marijuana found during a warrantless and non-consensual search 
of his car. Questions of probable cause, exigent circumstances, 
and the legality of the search were duly considered by the 
Court. Mr. Barrett's motion to suppress evidence was denied. 
The denial of the Motion to Suppress is now appealed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Were the necessary exigent circumstances and probable cause 
present to justify a warrantless search into Barrett's vehicle 
without his consent? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. Art. I, §14. 
The right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no Warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particulary describing the 
place to be searched, and the person ori 
thing to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
The right of people to be secure in theiij-
persons, houses, papers, and effectsj 
against unreasonable searches and seizures] 
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, particulary describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
Both constitutional provisions are identical in language 
except for punctuation. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2) (1953 as amended) provides: 
(2) When the circumstances make it 
reasonable to do so in the absence of an 
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affidavit, a search warrant may be issued 
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is 
not in the physical presence of the 
magistrate provided the magistrate is 
satisfied that probable cause exists for the 
issuance of the warrant. The sworn oral 
testimony may be communicated to the 
magistrate by telephone or other appropriate 
means and shall be recorded and transcribed. 
After transcription, the statement shall be 
certified by the magistrate and filed with 
the court. This statement shall be deemed 
to be an affidavit for purposes of this 
section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Defendant appeals the Trial Court's refusal to grant the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence. This appeal is from a 
final Judgment or Decree of the Court. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
On October 28, 1988, David L. Barrett was arrested and 
charged with the third degree felony of violating Utah's 
Controlled Substance Act, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1953, as amended). On November 10, 1988 Mr. Barrett entered a 
plea of "not guilty" to all charges against him. Trial was set 
for February 23, 1989, at the Juab County Courthouse. Mr. 
Barrett filed a Motion to Suppress and on February 22, 1989 a 
Suppression Hearing was held before the Court. Mr. Barrett's 
Motion to Suppress was denied. 
Mr. Barrett conditionally changed his plea to "No Contest," 
as provided in Sery, infra, which gives Mr. Barrett the right to 
appeal the Court's Suppression ruling and to withdraw his plea 
if it is determined on appeal that the Motion to Suppress should 
have been granted. On June 6, 1989, the Court granted a Motion 
to Sentence on the next lower category of offense. No 
certificate of probable cause issued and Defendant has served 
his jail sentence, is paying his fine, and is on probation. 
C. Disposition in Court Below: 
Mr. Barrett was found guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 
serve one year in the Juab County Jail and to pay a fine of 
$500.00 and $125.00 to the Victim's Reparation Fund. Mr. 
Barrett's jail sentence was suspended and he was required to 
serve sixty days in jail and to be on probation for eighteen 
months. The District Court's final disposition remains that Mr. 
Barrett is guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor. 
D. Statement of Facts: 
Appellant, David Barrett (Barrett), was the driver of the 
second of two cars pulled over by Sergeant Paul Mangelson 
(Mangelson), Utah Highway Patrol, on October 28, 1988, on 1-15 
in Nephi, Utah (Hearing Transcript, hereinafter T. 4-6). The 
vehicles were not traveling together (T. 7,53). Mangelson 
claimed he pulled the vehicles over for speeding (T. 5,16). 
Police backup arrived within 10 minutes (T. 9). Defendant 
claimed he was not speeding and that speeding was a pretext for 
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the stop (T. 48-49, 60). Mangelson first approached Barrett, 
requested his driver's license and registration, which was 
received, and spoke with Defendant briefly (T. 6) . Mangelson 
then approached the first car driven by Timothy Sandifer, who 
consented to a search of his vehicle (T. 61). Mangelson found a 
large duffel bag of raw marijuana in the trunk, unpacked it and 
arrested Mr. Sandifer (T. 6). Mangelson then returned and spoke 
with Mr. Barrett concerning his origin and destination (T. 6-7). 
During their conversation, Mangelson felt that Mr. Barrett was 
quite nervous (T. 14-16). 
A short distance away, sitting on the 'ground, was the 60 
lbs. of raw unpacked marijuana found in Mr. Sandifer's car (T. 
32) . Mangelson told Barrett that the gentlemen in front of him 
had a large quantity of marijuana in his trunk and that he could 
still smell it. He then asked for Barrett's consent to search 
Barrett's car "to be sure that I am not smelling it from up 
there," indicating Sandifer's car (T. 7,21). Barrett refused to 
consent to the search of his vehicle (T. 8,14,22,56); Defendant 
told Mangelson: "No, I don't want you looking through it." (T. 
8). Defendant's refusal made Mangelson "suspicious." (T. 14). 
Sergeant Mangelson then proceeded to search the car anyway. 
He reached into the car, took the keys, walked to the trunk of 
the car, and over the objection of Mr. Barrett opened the trunk 
(T. 15-16,56); and searched the contents of the trunk (T. 8,14). 
5 
Mangelson said his probable cause was Defendant's nervousness 
and the smell of marijuana (T. 22) . 
In the trunk of Mr. Barrett's vehicle, Sergeant Mangelson 
found a duffel bag containing marijuana (T. 8) . The marijuana 
was individually packaged in small zip-loc plastic bags (T. 50)• 
These small bags were then insulated from each other by the use 
of baking soda, an odor suppressing agent (T. 31-32, 50). The 
plastic zip-loc bags were then packaged in several larger 
garbage bags, each garbage bag being insulated from the others 
with baking soda. In all, the marijuana was sealed in no less 
than five layers of plastic, each insulated with baling soda, 
packaged inside of the duffel bag (T. 32,50). 
Mangelson testified at the Suppression Hearing that he had 
probable cause to search the vehicle because he could smell raw 
marijuana (T. 7,11). However, when questioned regarding 
probable cause, Mangelson testified that he did not have 
sufficient probable cause to arrest Barrett prior to conducting 
a search, as follows: 
Q: Why did you not arrest David prior to 
searching his trunk? 
A: What would I arrest him for? 
Q: Possession of marijuana? 
A: Well, I didn't know that he possessed it. (T.23). 
The trooper went on to state "I haven't got anything to 
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arrest him for under New York v. Belton, which is a smell case 
similar to this one." (T. 23-24). 
The officer stated that he was justified in conducting a 
search because of exigent circumstances which existed at the 
time (T. 23). When asked specifically what exigent 
circumstances existed, Mangelson replied: "Well it is a highway 
stop." (T. 23). 
Mangelson failed to notice that the vehicle identification 
number (VIN) on the registration which he held in his hand did 
not match the VIN on Mr. Barrett's vehicle (T. 2 6-27) . The VIN 
was a clerical error arising at Wyoming's DMV (T. 57). 
Mangelson subsequently testified that such a discrepancy would 
have justified his seizing and impounding the vehicle (T. 27) . 
Mangelson also testified that he made no attempt to obtain 
a radio or telephonic search warrant because, he had "done lots 
of searches like this and never had any problem with them," and 
in his sole discretion, "he really didn't feel it was 
necessary." (T. 26), and although he knew the procedure was 
available to him, "I have never did it" (T.25). 
Upon completion of the evidence presented in the 
Suppression Hearing, and the Judge's brief adjournment, the 
Court held that the stop was not pretextual, the alleged smell 
of marijuana constituted sufficient probable cause, (T. 81-82) 
and exigent circumstances existed justifying the warrantless 
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entry into the trunk of Barrett's vehicle (T. 82-83). The Judge 
said that Mangelson could smell the marijuana through all of the 
plastic bags and odor suppressing agents, (T. 83) because 
Mangelson had a "superior nose to the ordinary human being with 
regard to the smell of marijuana," (T. 82). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they 
fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
1967); State v. Coal, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983). Although 
automobile searches frequently fall within the exigent 
circumstances exception to obtaining a search warrant, 
automobiles per se do not obviate the requirement of a warrant. 
Where there are no compelling and exigent circumstances, the 
search of an automobile requires a warrant. 
In the instant case, the warrantless search of Mr. 
Barrett's vehicle was unconstitutional because there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. The 
police officer could have impounded the car or obtained a 
warrant by making radio contact with a magistrate as provided 
for by statute. The vehicle identification number on the car 
did not correspond with the vehicle registration, thus the 
police officer had the ability to impound the vehicle. The 
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vehicle could have been in custody thus eliminating any chance 
of escape or destruction of evidence. 
Also, the obtaining of a warrant would not have been 
impractical. A warrant, issued through radio contact, was 
available to the police officer. Rather than ignore the 
requirement for a search warrant altogether, the police officer 
should have obtained a warrant by police radio. This procedure 
would have been in harmony with the U.S. Const. Amend. IV, Utah 
Const. Art. I, §14, Utah Code §77-23-4(2) (1980). 
The Utah telephonic warrant statute, cited above, provides 
an independent state ground for requiring a warrant in this 
case. 
However, a warrant could not have been obtained, and a 
search should not be justified, because there was no probable 
cause to believe that Defendant possessed controlled substances. 
The police officer based his probable cause for the search on 
"nervousness" and his alleged smell of marijuana. Nervousness 
is not grounds for probable cause, State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah 1988) . In fact, nervousness may be given no weight in 
determining reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1988); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). Therefore, smell was the sole element 
of probable cause. Smell may have been on the officer's hands 
from unpacking 60 lbs. of marijuana from the Sandifer car, or as 
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the officer suspected, the smell may have been coming from the 
Sandifer car or the unpacked marijuana sitting a short distance 
away. Smell was never confirmed by a drug sniffing dog, or 
otherwise. Therefore, probable cause was lacking. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE 
EVIDENCE FOUND DURING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE BECAUSE THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I 
§ 14 of. the Utah Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures and require searches to be done pursuant to a valid 
search warrant issued by an impartial magistrate. This 
requirement is binding on the states as well as the federal 
government. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Wong Sun v. 
United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) the Court broadened this rule 
by stating that evidence tainted by failure to secure a warrant 
is to be suppressed. 
"Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they 
fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967); State v. Coal, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983) (. State v. 
Holmes, 107 Ut.Adv.Rpts 74, 76 (Ct. App., 1989). 
Only in a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions may a warrantless search be performed. State v. 
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Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967). One such exception is the "automobile 
exception" established in Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925) . The "automobile exception" applies where a vehicle is 
readily mobile, the occupants are alerted and the obtaining of a 
warrant would allow the suspects to escape or destroy their 
incriminating evidence. Under these conditions the requirement 
for a warrant is relaxed. 
In Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1924) the 
Supreme Court authorized warrantless searches of automobiles if 
the car is so moveable at the time that the car's contents may 
never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43 (1970). This search is valid only on 
the additional condition that a warrant would have been issued 
(as determined by an after the fact review of the circumstances) 
subject to review in a motion to suppress; and if it is 
determined that a warrant would not have been issued, the 
evidence seized in the search must be suppressed. If a warrant 
should have been obtained, the evidence must be suppressed. 
Although exigent circumstances apply to automobiles more 
often than anything else, the presence of exigent circumstances 
cannot be assumed but must be compelling before a warrantless 
search is justified. Exigent circumstances do not exist when 
the automobile is in custody or is no longer highly mobile. 
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Neither are there exigent circumstances where there is not a 
high probability that the car's contents will be lost if a 
warrant is obtained. See Chambers, supra. In Coolidae v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-462 (1971), the Court said "The 
I 
word 'automobile# is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears." (emphasis added) See also 
State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478, 482 (Utah 1981) (Wilkins 
concurring). 
In this case, Defendant's vehicle was searched without a 
warrant when there were no exigent circumstances. The 
warrantless search was unjustified for two reasons. 
First, it would not have been impractical for the police 
officer to obtain a warrant; and evidence would not be lost 
while a warrant was being obtained. Warrants are now, and were 
at the time of the search, available by radio or telephone and 
are authorized by statute. Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2) (1953 as 
amended) provides: 
(2) When the circumstances make it 
reasonable to do so in the absence of an 
affidavit, a search warrant may be issued 
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is 
not in the physical presence of the 
magistrate provided the magistrate is 
satisfied that probable cause exists for the 
issuance of the warrant. The sworn oral 
testimony may be communicated to the 
magistrate by telephone or other appropriate 
means and shall be recorded and transcribed. 
After transcription, the statement shall be 
certified by the magistrate and filed with 
the court. This statement shall be deemed 
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to be an affidavit for purposes of this 
section. Id. (Addendum 1) 
A search warrant could have been authorized by an impartial 
magistrate through radio contact. Mangelson could have 
requested a "telephone patch" through dispatch. The call would 
have been automatically recorded for easy transcription. 
Mangelson knew this procedure was available but he "really 
didn't feel it was necessary." (T.26). Mangelson said he had 
"done lots of searches like this" and with regard to the 
telephone warrant "I have never did it." (T.25). 
The officer has no excuse for not obtaining a warrant. Our 
Supreme Court has said: 
Telephone warrants are provided for in Utah 
Code Ann. §77-23-4 (1982). The government 
should actively encourage its law 
enforcement agents to seek search warrants 
whenever possible and by any available means 
provided by statute. Judicial officers 
should cooperate to the utmost in promoting 
this policy. 
Ashe, supra, 59. 
Justices Durham and Zimmerman went further in their dissent 
by stating that the prosecution must prove unavailability of a 
telephone warrant, and this theory was not opposed by the 
majority. 
INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS: Our Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly urged counsel to brief the Court on the 
State Constitutional issues. State v. Earl, 716 P. 2d 803, 805-
13 
06 (Utah 1986). Several bases for such analysis have been 
recognized. 
For example, state grounds may be applicable to eliminate 
conflicts of different jurisdictions on the same issue. State 
v. Ashe, supra, (Justice Durham dissenting). However, in 
Barrett7s case, my office has only found consistent law that 
exigent circumstances did not exist, a search warrant should 
have been obtained, and the evidence should be suppressed. 
When one reads Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4 (1982) , in harmony 
with Utah Const. Art. I, §14, it creates an independent state 
ground upon which a search may be conducted when alleged 
exigencies exist. It is Defendant's position that the 
prosecution has the burden of proving both exigent circumstances 
and the unavailability of a reasonable warrant procedure before 
a warrantless search is permissible under our state 
constitution. I believe this is very well supported by all 
Justices in Ashe. 
The second reason a warrantless search was unjustified was 
because the vehicle identification number on the car did not 
correspond with the automobile registration and therefore the 
police officer could have seized and impounded the car. The car 
would no longer be mobile. During the time that the car would 
have been impounded, the police officer could have petitioned 
for a search warrant. 
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When the chances of escape or loss of evidence are no 
longer compelling, the exigent circumstance exception to the 
Fourth Amendment is no longer applicable. Chambers, supra. 
Such is the case with Mr. Barrett. Mr. Barrett had no chance of 
escape while the police officer obtained a warrant. A warrant 
obtained by radio would have required only minutes. Mr. Barrett 
would have been under constant surveillance by the police 
officer and his back-up while the warrant was being issued. 
Also, the police officer had the ability to impound the car. If 
the police officer had done this, then obtained a warrant, Mr. 
Barrett's constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures would not have been violated. 
The fact that the police officer chose not to, or through 
poor procedure failed to, take advantage of a radio warrant or 
to look carefully at the vehicle identification number of the 
car and registration does not excuse the police officer any more 
than if the officer failed to obtain a warrant to search a 
house. The fact that he discovered incriminating evidence and 
that the officer "did no more than [he] might properly have done 
with prior judicial sanction" does not outweigh Mr. Barrett's 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the Court should not "retroactively validate [the 
officer's] conduct." Katz at 356. 
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Because the police officer failed to obtain a search 
warrant, either by radio or by impounding the car and obtaining 
a warrant through normal processes, the police officer violated 
the Federal and State Constitutions prohibiting this type of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The evidence obtained as a 
result of this search, therefore, should have been suppressed. 
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the search of Mr. 
Barrett's automobile and seizure of its contents are 
indistinguishable from Coolidae and Griffin. In those cases the 
Court said that where there is no danger to the police officer 
or danger of the criminal escaping or destroying the evidence, 
there is nothing to invoke the rule of Carrol v. United States. 
"[B]y no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be 
made into a case where "it is not practicable to secure a 
warrant," Carrol supra, at 153...and the "automobile exception," 
despite its label, is simply irrelevant. Coolidae, 403 U.S. at 
462; State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d at 482." 
Although there was contraband, there was no opportunity to 
destroy it before a warrant could be obtained and exigent 
circumstances did not exist. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF A SEARCH OF MR. BARRETT'S 
VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Perhaps the reason the arresting officer failed to obtain a 
search warrant, or present his probable cause to a magistrate, 
was because the probable cause was insufficient to support the 
issuance of a search warrant or a warrantless search of the car. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
the Utah Constitution require that search warrants be issued 
only upon probable cause. The exigent circumstance exception to 
the rule requiring a warrant before a search does not escape the 
requirement of probable cause. 
Probable cause is defined by Black7s Law Dictionary as 
"reasonable cause: having more evidence for than against." 
Mangelson testified that his probable cause to search the 
vehicle was Defendant's extreme nervousness and the smell of 
marijuana. (T. 22) Physical manifestations of nervousness were 
Barrett's trembling hands (T. 15) , and "the artery on the side 
of his neck was pulsing, you could take his pulse rate there on 
the side of his neck." (T. 15). 
In State v. Mendoza, supra, State v. Sery, supra, the Court 
set forth a standard of review requiring whether a person's 
apparent nervousness was any different from that observed in 
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countless travelers — or if nervousness existed at all. As 
admitted by Mangelson, and I believe as objective knowledge 
entitled to judicial notice, almost everyone's hands shake when 
they are pulled over by a police officer, and being able to take 
the pulse on someone's neck is a well known medical fact. As 
provided in Mendoza, supra, and Serv, supra, these factors 
should not be given any weight by the Court in determining 
whether the officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless 
search. 
The officer claims that he could smell raw marijuana in 
Defendant's car. Under the circumstances, it would be 
practically impossible for him to smell the marijuana, and it is 
far more likely that if he did smell marijuana at all he was 
smelling the marijuana from the Sandifer vehicle parked a short 
distance up the road with 60 lbs. of raw marijuana unpacked in 
bulk, and sitting in the open. Officer Mangelson must have had 
the smell of marijuana on his hands, having unpacked 60 lbs. of 
raw marijuana within the last few minutes. The marijuana in Mr. 
Barrett's vehicle was packaged in approximately 3 0 small zip-loc 
plastic bags surrounded by 6 to 10 garbage bags each insulated 
with odor suppressing agents. Although the police officer has 
been trained to detect marijuana, to accept the police officer's 
claim that he could smell marijuana through so much insulation 
is clearly erroneous. To allow the trial Court to find that 
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the police officer had such a superior nose that he can smell 
substances packaged in such a way as to be smell-proof would 
give undue credibility to the police officer and perverts our 
legal system. 
As previously stated, Mangelson admitted that he did not 
know that Barrett possessed marijuana (T. 23) He went on to say 
that he has nothing to arrest Barrett for under New York v. 
Belton, supra, "which is a smell case similar to this one" (T. 
23-24). It should be noted that there are no other smell cases 
similar to this one. The County attorney cited numerous cases 
to the Court, all of which included the fact of recently burned 
marijuana, example Cole v. State, 728 P.2d 492 (Okl.Cr. 1986). 
The only case which has provided for raw marijuana odors 
constituting probable cause, would be State v. Groves, 649 P.2d 
366 (Hawaii 1982), wherein readily apparent marijuana odors were 
confirmed by a drug sniffing dog prior to the police obtaining a 
search warrant. Likewise, in Sery, supra, the investigating 
officers obtained a search warrant after a drug sniffing dog 
cued on Sery's baggage. 
The common theme running through these cases, is that smell 
alone may justify further inquiry, such as a drug sniffing dog, 
to help support a finding of probable cause in the issuance of a 
search warrant. 
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If we are to validate any police search based upon an 
alleged smell, there would be no check against police officers 
performing warrantless searches of automobiles where they are 
only pretextual. An officer could claim he smelled marijuana 
without fear of disbelief by the Court. With this guaranteed 
credibility, the police can stop and search any person. 
Unfortunately, the only time we learn about these types of 
searches is when incriminating evidence is found. Mangelson 
himself said he makes warrantless searches all the time (T. 
25,26) and that he does not report negative searches. We have 
no way of knowing whether he actually did smell the marijuana 
because fruitless searches are not reported. The officer can 
justify any search by merely claiming after the fact that he 
smelled marijuana, when in fact he did not. 
We cannot ignore "the overriding purpose of the Fourth 
Amendments provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures...to safe guard personal privacy against arbitrary and 
unwarranted intrusions by governmental officials." State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), Cert, denied, 480 U.S. 
930 (1987). 
The fact that there was marijuana in the trunk of the car 
does not mean that the police officer could smell it, 
(especially under the facts and circumstances of this case). 
Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution was intended to eliminate 
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this type of conduct. To give this kind of unchecked 
credibility to the officer, especially where it is so obvious 
that he could not have smelled the marijuana, would thwart and 
undermine the very purpose of these consitutional provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The warrantless search of Mr. Barrett's vehicle violated 
the constitution of the United States and of the State of Utah. 
The evidence found as a result of the illegal search should 
therefore have been suppressed and the decision of the Trial 
Court should be reversed. 
The Trial Court's decision should also be reversed because 
it was clearly erroneous and was an abuse of discretion. To 
accept that the police could smell marijuana under the existing 
circumstances is specious. This unchecked credibility given to 
police officers would eliminate any protection against random 
searches. 
For the above reasons, the Trial Court's decision should be 
reversed and the evidence seized during the illegal search 
should be suppressed and the case remanded or dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this SlaT day of November, 1989. 
K 
De fendant/Appel1ant 
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Utah Code Annotated §77-23-4(2) (1953 as amended) 
EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES -
WITNESS NOT IN PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF MAGISTRATE -
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL WARRANTS - RETURN. 
When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the 
absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon 
sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the physical 
presence of the magistrate provided the magistrate is satisfied 
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. The 
sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by 
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and 
transcribed. After transcription, the statement shall be 
certified by the magistrate and filed with the court. This 
statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for purposes of 
this section. 
